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Abstract
Economic  globalisation  is  the  defining  characteristic  of  our  age  and  a  process  which  is  
transforming the parameters of the national state and global power relations. However, it is also  
a contradictory, uneven and unpredictable phenomenon. East Asia has been at the epicenter of  
globalisation for the past 30 years and will continue to be so with the rise of China’s economy.  
The region has been one of the main beneficiaries of the globalisation process, with exceptional  
geo-political advantages producing terms of engagement with the global economy not matched  
by other developing regions. However, its relations have also been paradoxical. At a time when  
globalisation theory predicted the demise of the national economy and the waning of national  
identity, East Asian growth was driven, above all,  by the developmental state, with strong and  
interventionist governments often successfully supporting ‘national’ neo-merchantilist economic  
policies and strong state identities.  Some argue that the developmental state has now run its  
historical course, made redundant by its own success in the global market. This article examines  
the evidence for the changing nature of the state in the global economy asks what are the likely  
future forms of the state in East Asia.
Globalisation  – understood as the  rapid acceleration  of cross-border flows of capital, 
goods, services, people and ideas – is, as is often said, the defining feature of our age. 
There have been other periods in world history of rapid internationalisation, not least in 
the  years  before  WW1,  but  the  changes  since  1970  have  been  qualitatively  distinct, 
transforming the way the world is organised and how we experience it. 
The causes are in part historically contingent – not least with the deregulatory thrust of 
Anglo-American neo-liberal policy which goes back to the regimes of Margaret Thatcher 
in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the USA. But they are also structural, above all with the 
continuing revolution in information technology compressing time/space and allowing 
the geographical disaggregation of manufacturing and services operations (Harvey, 1989; 
Castells, 1997).  It is the structural changes – ushering in what Castells has called the 
‘information age’ – which justify talking of an epochal shift in the world economy. In this 
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sense  economic  globalisation  is  a  permanent  change,  although  its  forms  are  not 
predetermined. How it is managed may change, and needs to change (Stiglitz, 2002) but 
the technology of globalisation will not be reversed (Wolf, 2004).
The domination of the world economy by transnational corporations (TNCs) and their 
global networks of power and finance is the most visible and central  outcome of this 
process (Castells, 1997). On a recent count there were 53 000 multinational corporations 
with 415 000 subsidiaries, accounting for 25 percent of global output, two thirds of global 
trade (Carnoy and Castells, 2001) and up to half of world value-added (Beck 2000).  The 
largest of these corporations now dwarf national economies. Over 50 of the 100 largest 
economic entities in the world are companies not states (Mok, this volume)1, and many of 
these leviathons are now almost beyond the effective control of the states which host 
them  but  can  longer  effectively  tax  them.  It  is  estimated  that  in  the  UK  unpaid 
corporation taxes of TNCs are equal to the entire budget of the National Health Service. 
One of  the  difficulties  for  Governments  is  that  modern  IT allows  real-time  financial 
transactions that are hard, though not impossible, to monitor and regulate (Gray, 1998). 
Daily trade in the currency markets stood at $ 1.5 trillion in 1998 and increased eightfold 
between 1986 and 1998 (Carnoy and Castells, 2001, p. 3; Thurow, 1996). The TNCs are 
at the heart of the global networks and flows of money and power which are the engine of 
globalisation (Castells, 1997). 
It  may  be  exaggerated  to  talk,  as  Robert  Reich  and others  have  done (Reich,  1991; 
Ohmae, 1990) of the end of the ‘national economy’.  Increasingly difficult  as it is for 
governments to regulate capital flows, they do still have some power to control important 
areas of their economies, although it often convenient for them to hide unpopular reforms 
behind the mask of global economic inevitability. They still have some discretion over 
taxation and public spending, as is clearly apparent from the large variations in tax and 
public expenditure rates across the OECD countries, and overall levels of taxation in the 
richer countries have continued to rise during the latest phase of globalisation in the teeth 
1 This is if one judges by the overall sales of corporations. Wolf (2004) estimates the figure as 37 out of the 
top 100 based on corporate value added. 
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of the pressures of the global market.2  Despite real fears that globalisation can cause a 
‘race  to  the  bottom’  in  social  expenditures,  some  high  productivity  countries  have 
managed to hold out. Highly taxed European states such as Denmark, France, Sweden 
and  Finland,  for  instance,  were  running  large  trade  surpluses  in  2002  and  were  not 
experiencing capital flight (Wolf, 2004). National economies are also necessary to TNCs: 
all TNCs have national bases which provide their core markets and investors, their core 
skilled labour forces and their primary scientific and technological seedbeds (Hirsh and 
Thompson, 1996). How these are regulated substantially effects their business which is 
why they spend substantial  sums in  lobbying  governments  to  ensure  they meet  their 
requirements.  The global corporations are thus rooted in national economies,  but they 
extend way beyond them and often exceed their effective reach and control. 
Global corporations not only not only dominate key markets for goods across the world, 
putting smaller firms out of business, fill up public space with advertising (Klein, 2000) 
and condition where jobs will migrate, they also challenge key policies of democratically 
elected governments.  The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and its successor 
initiatives  well  illustrate  this  point.  Originally  inspired by proposals  on safeguards  to 
international investors from CEOs of 46 of Europe’s largest corporations (The European 
Round Table of Industrialists) and later negotiated with corporations and governments by 
the OECD, the MAI promised to enshrine new protocols for the global economy which 
would have given corporations the power to challenge any national laws on labour rights, 
environmental protection and safety standards where these were deemed prejudicial to 
investors.  Secret  tribunals  were  to  be  empowered  to  order  Governments  to  pay 
compensation to companies, and corporations were to be allowed to sue governments, not 
only for losses already suffered, but also for the loss on profits they might have made had 
certain  laws not  existed (Monbiot,  2000).  The secret  treaty was leaked,  subsequently 
posted  on  the  internet  by protestors  in  1997,  and finally  collapsed  when  the  French 
Government withdrew from hosting the meeting to agree the proposals. They had been 
warned by a study they had commissioned that it threatened the nation’s health, safety 
2 Government tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in 2000 varied from 53.6 percent in Sweden, to 48.8 
percent in Denmark, 37.4 percent in the UK and 29.6 percent in the USA Government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP for a sample of 13 rich countries has grown from 13.1  percent in 1913 to 41.9 percent 
in 1980 and 45 percent in 1996 (Wolf, 2004, p.253).
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and environmental laws and would criminalise the Government’s attempts to protect the 
national film industry (Monbiot, 2000). 
This, however, was not the end of the story. The European Commission, with the active 
support  of the UK Government,  immediately shifted negotiations  on the proposals to 
another  forum:  the  WTO.  Developments  through  the  WTO  were  thwarted  by  the 
protestors at Seattle in 1999, but continue through negotiations within trading blocks such 
as NAFTA and the EU and between them through organisations like the Transatlantic 
Business  Dialogue.  Leading  members  of  the  WTO,  including  the  USA,  the  UK and 
Australia, continue to push for a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which 
would substantially open up traditionally public sector services such as education and 
health to corporate penetration (Robertson, Bonal and Dale, 2002). 
This  ongoing  process  of  global  corporate  challenge  to  democratic  government  well 
illustrates the immense power of the TNCs and the new transnational capitalist class. It 
not only threatens national democratic control over questions of labour conditions, human 
rights and the environment, but can also reach to the heart of the core provision of the 
welfares states which determine the quality of people’s lives. While some states, notably 
in Scandinavia,  have managed largely to protect their welfare systems, corporations have 
learnt that by threatening to move jobs elsewhere they can effectively hold some more-
market oriented governments to ransom, forcing them to reduce the taxes and social costs 
which underpin welfare provision (Monbiot, 2000). 
.
The  increasing  interconnectedness  of  the  world  economy  has  not  been  matched  by 
commensurate  transformations  in  political  and  social  structures:  there  is  a  global 
capitalism  but no global governance and a very one-sided global civil society. Theories 
of cultural and political globalisation are premature. A global technology and a global 
organisation of the market and of organisations of capital has emerged, but – pace Ulrich 
Beck (2000)  –  this  has  not  created,  and does  not  necessarily  portend,  a  global  civil 
society, as such. Whilst consumer and anti-globalisation activism suggests possible future 
forms of resistance, labour has notably failed to match the global organisation of capital 
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and the emergence of a transnational capitalist class (Sklair, 1997). There is currently a 
massive disjuncture between economics and politics. 
As  Marx wrote  of  late  feudalism and Durkheim of  19 th century  industrialisation,  the 
economic forces have outrun the social relations of production and the ability of societies 
to  adapt  to  them,  leading  the  multiple  conflicts  and tensions.  Hans-Peter  Martin  and 
Harold Schumann (1996) wrote, without exaggeration, a decade ago that: 
‘The foremost task of democratic politicians on the threshold of the next century will be 
to restore the state and the primacy of politics over economics. If this is not done, the 
dramatic fusing together of humanity through technology and trade will soon turn into the 
opposite and lead to global crack-up.’  
The effects of globalisation on the nation state has been much debated. We can rule out 
the fantasies of the hyper-globalists (Ohmae et al) about the coming of a borderless world 
(Ohmae, 1990). This is not happening and is unlikely to happen. New states are being 
formed  all  the  time  –  with  more  than  twenty  arising  from the  ashes  of  the  former 
Yugoslavia and Eastern block in the last  20 years  (Smith,  1996).  Old states  hang on 
tenatiously to their territory and sovereignty.  Europe moves at glacial speed towards a 
federal structure because popular majorities in most  states are reluctant  to loose their 
national identities and the political powers of the governments which they elect. Borders 
are getting stronger, not weaker, not least as Fortress Europe puts up the walls against 
migrants and asylum seekers. Wars are still fought between states. The wars of the US 
and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq have been wars between states, albeit that the US 
claims it is fighting the more elusive global threat of terrorism. 
There is good reason why nation states are not simply throwing in the towel in the face of 
economic globalisation and that is that there is as yet nothing effective with which to 
replace them. International institutions lack power (UN) or democratic legitimacy (WTO, 
IMF, World Bank) or both (EU). People do not identify with European institutions and do 
not,  yet,  offer them their  loyalty  and trust  (Smith,  1996).  The global  enforces of the 
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‘Washington Consensus’ – the WTO, The World  Bank, the IMF - operate behind closed 
doors,  in  the  interests  of  the  investors  and  corporations  of  the  western  states  and, 
particularly, of the US which dominates them (Stiglitz, 2002). Transnational civil society 
is weak except in form of the growing transnational capitalist elite (Sklair, 2002). Nation 
states remain the building blocks of international governance,  which lacks democratic 
credibility without them, and continue to be the main locus of popular allegiance and 
democratic activity.
National states are not disappearing and will not disappear. However, they are becoming 
weaker.  This  is  for  a  number  of  reasons.  Castells  has  written  that  ‘the  instrumental 
capacity  of  the  nation state  is  decisively undermined  by the globalisation  of  its  core 
economic activities, by globalisation of the media, and by globalisation of crime’ (1997, 
p.  244).  Elsewhere  he  adds  to  those  the  effects  of  military  inter-dependence, 
regionalisation and identity politics.
The  reduction  of  state  autonomy  through  military  inter-dependence  and  multilateral 
alliances is not entirely new. The international order has been dependent on inter-state 
alliances  and  military  co-operation  since  the  17th century  treaty  of  Westphalia  first 
enshrined notions of international law and national sovereignty. Notwithstanding NATO, 
the UN and other  international  organisations,  the nature of the world order is  not, in 
principle, different. Most states depend for security on their alliances with other states, 
and it is only a superpower, such as currently the USA, that can effectively act alone and 
then  only  for  a  limited  time  (Johnson,  2000).  However,  the  nature  of  the  modern 
technology of war, being so technologically advanced and costly, and the global threat of 
nuclear weapons, are new and limit the military autonomy of states in ways that did not 
apply before.
However, it is the changing nature of the global economy which most erodes the power 
of nation states. Governments are increasingly indebted to global capital, and the power 
of the global economy reduces their control over monetary, fiscal and budgetary policies. 
These constraints are not, perhaps, as absolute as some Governments like to claim to their 
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electorates. Some states have managed to adopt policies which buck the global market. 
Malaysia and China, for instance, both faced down international capital by making their 
currencies non-convertible, thus reducing the domestic impact on their economies of the 
1997 financial crisis.  However, many other states, such as France under Mitterand in the 
1980s, and Hong Kong in 1997, tried to go against the global financial institutions and 
failed. 
Limited  control  over  economic  policy has  major  effects  on government  autonomy in 
other areas. Where budgets have to be contained to meet the demands of international 
finance and, in the case of Europe, the requirements of the Growth and Stability Pact, 
major  constraints  are  placed  on  welfare  and  social  policies.  Global  competition  and 
international capital often force states into a downward spiral of social costs competition 
leaving  little  space  for  different  welfare  national  regimes  except  where  backed  by 
differential advantages in productivity and production quality (Castells, 1997). 
Governments are faced with increasingly diverse demands from their electorates which 
they are frequently unable to meet. This, in turn, leads to growing popular disillusionment 
with governments and, at the extreme, a crisis in state legitimacy (Hobsbawm, 1994). 
Globalisation of the media and what Castells calls the ‘de-nationalisation’ of information 
leave governments little room to manoeuvre when such crises occur. Some countries like 
China and Singapore may seek to control information from Satellite and the Internet but 
it  is  doubtful  whether  this  can  last.  Unable  now to  hide  behind  the  smokescreen  of 
propaganda from state regulated media, Governments which are seen to fail to deliver 
increasingly incur the skepticism and outright distrust of their electorates. According to 
most polls, trust in government and state institutions is declining rapidly in many states 
(Castells, 1997).
Increasingly national governments are seen as too small to deal with the big issues, like 
global crime and the environment,  and too large to deal with the smaller issues, like local 
planning  and  service  provision.  Frequently,  and  sometimes  in  order  to  devolve 
responsibility for unpopular measures, governments devolve power to regional and local 
7
levels. This may temporarily shore up their legitimacy, but it the long run only further 
serves further to undermine them, as the nation state becomes increasingly powerless, 
diminished by the growing strength of the global economy and international polity above 
it, and by the rejuvenated local state beneath (Castells, 1997; Touraine, 2000) .  
The reduced efficacy of the national state is mirrored, in a paradoxical way, by the rise of 
nationalism and identity politics. The nation state may no longer be, as Eric Hobsbawm 
(1990) famously wrote, ‘the primary vector of historical development’ but nationalism 
has been a burgeoning force in the post cold war world. Recrudescent nationalism, and 
the rise of supra-national and sub-national movements based on ethnicity and religion, 
including both Christian and Islamic fundamentalisms, may all be seen in different ways 
as  defensive  reactions  against  threats  to  traditional  values  and  cultures  posed  by 
globalisation, threats which national states no longer have the power to ameliorate. So too 
the other myriad movements of identity based on lifestyles, regions, sexual orientation or 
environmental concerns. The national state is increasingly caught between the twin axes 
of the glocalisation process (Robertson, 1995)  – between the global networks of power 
and money,  on the one hand, and the growing manifestations of identity and cultural 
particularism on the other (Touraine, 2000; Castells, 1997). In many states, though not 
all,  national  (state)  identity  becomes  etiolated.  Identity  and  citizenship,  once  united 
through  notions  of  national  identity  and  statehood,  are  increasingly  sundered,  with 
citizenship reduced to a pale instrumentalism of abstracts rights and procedures (Delanty, 
2000).
Globalisation,  however,  is  not  a  uniform process  and states  respond differently  to  it. 
Whilst  the  great  myths  of  the  globalists  (Ohmae,  1990;  Reich,  1991)  are  that 
globalisation  is  linear,  encompassing  and inevitable,  the  reality  is  that  it  is  a  highly 
uneven  and  unpredictable  process  (Hay  and  Marsh,  2000).  Globalisation  is  part 
technological  and  structural  and  part  contingent.  It  is  a  dialectical  and  contradictory 
process and its future forms will depend on political decisions as well as economic and 
technological forces. Just as the last great surge of internationalisation was cut short by 
first world war and the protectionist national responses to the economic depression in the 
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period between the world wars (James, 2001), so too the future of globalisation will be 
conditioned by both economic and political forces. 
Globalisation is uneven temporally and also spatially. Only the three regions of Europe, 
East  Asia  and  North  America  are  fully  engaged  with  the  process  and  even  they  in 
different ways. Globalisation has not produced an end of history nor an end of ideologies, 
as in Francis Fukuyama’s inebriated post cold war prophesies (Fukuyama, 1995). In fact 
the  world has  divided into  myriad  forms  of  capitalism ranging from the  shareholder 
capitalism of the anglo-phone countries, to the stakeholder capitalism of Germany, the 
corporate capitalism of Japan and Korea and the so-called ‘bandit’ capitalism of post-
communist  Russia (Castells,  1997; Dore,  2000; Gray,  1998).  The rise of the sleeping 
giant in China portends the creation of a completely new form of capitalism in the largest 
market in the world. Its future impact on  the world economy puts off all bets on what 
models  will  dominate  world  capitalism in  the  years  to  come.  The  East  Asian  states 
provide yet other models of state-market relations. 
Globalisation and the State in East Asia
East  Asia,  including  Japan  and  the  four  ‘tiger  economies’  of  South  Korea,  Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, has been at the epicenter of the globalisation process for 30 
years and one of its major beneficiaries. Between 1965 and 1996 economic growth in the 
Asian Pacific averaged 8.5 percent per annum (Castells, 1997, p. 207), a record of rapid 
and sustained regional development without historical precedent and one that saw the 
tigers industrialise in a fraction of the time it had taken the older industrial nations.3 This 
‘economic miracle’ (World Bank, 1994) was achieved through exceptionally favourable 
forms of engagement with the developing global economy, which no other developing 
regions  have  been  able  to  match.  It  was  also  accompanied  by  distinctive  state 
characteristics which mark out the region from other developed regions in the world in 
the era of globalisation. For most of this period, East Asian states remained relatively 
egalitarian  in  resource  distribution  (Birdsall,  Ross  and  Sabot,  1995);  several  retained 
3 It took Britain 58 years to double its real per capita income from 1780. The USA did it in 47 years from 
1839 and Japan in 34 years from 1900. South Korea  took 11 years from 1966 (Morris, 1995).
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distinctively  ‘national’  economies,  despite  their  export  orientation;  and  all  of  them 
retained strong states  and strong state identities. 
Despite the important differences between the tiger economies, there were a number of 
common characteristics which aided rapid growth. The region as a whole was favoured 
by the geo-political circumstances of the time, as the Cold War brought in substantial 
investment from the USA and the UK. Each of the countries developed highly export 
oriented economies based on manufacturing and were favoured by the growth of world 
trade at the time. They also had strong endowments of human capital, with literacy rates 
high  even  at  the  start  of  industrialisation  (Tilak,  2002),  and  recognized  the  need  to 
maximise on these assets in the absence of major natural resources. The social formations 
in the tiger states were also beneficial for economic change in that in each case, due to 
land reforms at the end of the colonial period, there was no powerful landowner class to 
impose barriers to modernization. However, the most important common feature behind 
the  exceptional  economic  growth  in  the  tiger  economies  was  the  existence  of  the 
developmental state, just as it had been with Japan (Castells, 1997).  
What is the developmental state? In its most obvious manifestation it is the strong state 
which dedicates itself to national economic development and which derives its legitimacy 
from  achieving  this.  As  Manuel  Castells  writes:  ‘A  state  is  developmental  when  it  
establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote and sustain development,  
understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of economic growth  
and structural changes in the productive system, both domestically and in relation to the  
international  economy.’  (Castells,  1997,  p.276).  However,  what  lies  behind  the 
developmental  state  is  an  exceptional  form of  state  formation  born of  the  nationalist 
project of survival. As Castells rightly remarks, for the developmental state ‘economic 
development is not a goal but a means ...the East Asian developmental state ...was born  
of the need for survival, and then it grew on the basis of a nationalist project of self-
affirmation of cultural and political identity in the world system.’ (1992, p.57-58).
Developmental states committed to accelerated state formation have occurred historically 
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under quite specific circumstances. Chalmers Johnson has written that ‘the very idea of  
the  developmental  state  originated  in  the  situational  nationalism  of  the  late  
industrialisers, and the goals of the developmental state were invariably derived from  
comparison with external reference economies.’  (Johnson, 1982, p.24). This accurately 
characterises not only the position of Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan at the point 
where their developmental states arose, but also post-Napoleonic Prussia, arguably the 
first developmental state of modern times (Marquand, 1988). 
Historically,  accelerated  state  formation,  led  by  developmental  states,  has  normally 
occurred in response to foreign military invasion or threats of invasion (post-Napoleonic 
Prussia  and Meiji  Japan);  in  the aftermath  of  revolutions  and civil  wars  (Napoleonic 
France and the early republic in USA); and during periods of post-war reconstruction 
(post-World War Two Japan and Germany). In each case there has been an element of 
catching up with some regional power or world economic leader (Prussia and France with 
the UK in the 1830s and 1840s and Japan with the West in the 1880s). In each case also 
the process has been accompanied by a revived and intensified spirit of national self-
affirmation (which is not necessarily the same thing as militaristic national chauvinism) 
(Green, 1990). 
The  East  Asian  developmental  states,  though  emerging  later  and  in  different 
circumstances from the western examples and from Japan, all fit this pattern. They also 
happen to be concentrated in the same geographical region which makes them such a 
good laboratory  for  analysing  the  geo-political  conditions  which  seem to  accompany 
developmental state formation.
State  formation  in  the  East  Asian  developmental  states  has  been  massively  pre-
conditioned by geo-political factors. Japan and the four tigers are all strongly bordered 
islands  or  peninsular states (in the case of Korea separated from China by mountain 
ranges but now divided along the 38th parallel). Their insular geographies have provided 
certain natural advantages for trade, security and internal cohesion but also dangers in 
that  their  ports  and  strategic  locations  have  made  them  attractive  sites  for  foreign 
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incursion. Japan resisted invasion and colonisation through rapid modernisation led by 
the Meiji reformers after 1868. The four Asian tigers were all colonised, Hong Kong and 
Singapore  by  Britain  and  Taiwan  and  Korea  by  Japan  (which  was  also  briefly  in 
Singapore). In each case independence brought prolonged national insecurity and crises 
of state viability linked to post-war regional tensions. 
Korea emerged after the war from 36 years of Japanese colonialism only to descend into 
a bloody civil war that left the South divided from a hostile Communist North and a 
continuing site of cold-war tensions. Taiwan also gained independence from Japanese 
colonial rule after the war, but the Kuomintang regime continued to face hostility from 
mainland China which contested its  territorial  sovereignty.  Singapore gained self-rule 
from  the  British  in  1959  and  Independence  in  1963  but  was  cast  adrift  from  the 
Malaysian Federation in 1965 to face a future as a multi-racial and polyglot small island 
state which no-one thought viable (Chua, 1995; Rodan, 1989). Neither external security 
nor internal harmony were made easier by the fact of it being culturally and politically 
sandwiched between two much larger nations, Malaysia and China, with which its two 
major populations had close ethnic ties, but with whom political relations were difficult. 
In each of these three cases, as with Japan in the previous century, external relations 
posed  threats  to  national  sovereignty  and  even  survival  and  were  exacerbated  by 
economic backwardness relative to significant external referents (the West for Japan and 
Japan  for  the  tigers).  Each  nation  believed  that  national  survival  and  economic 
development were inextricably linked and each looked to foreign models as a way of 
development. These were the conditions that underlay the ‘situational nationalism’ which 
Johnson (1982) and Castells (1992) have rightly identified as the seed-bed for the rise of 
the development states in Japan, and three tigers. The fourth tiger, Hong Kong, although 
it faced some of the same regional tensions, could not produce a developmental state 
because it was a British colony legally destined to be returned to China. 
Crises of national viability provide a context for the rise of developmental states but they 
can hardly be said to guarantee their emergence or to ensure their success. Many states in  
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such  circumstances  have  not  become  successfully  developmentalist,  even  if,  as  in 
numerous  African  and Latin  American  states,  they  have spawned  popular  nationalist 
movements and interventionist governments. Other factors were also important in East 
Asia. 
Timing  was  crucial.  Japan’s  first  modernising  initiative  gathered  pace  as  the  world 
economy was booming at the turn of the century; its economic growth stalled during the 
protectionist  inter-war years,  and took off  again during the post-war boom (Johnson, 
1982). The tigers took off in the early 1960s in a period of relatively open world markets 
and continued expansion (World Bank, 1994). Further to this, and crucial for the tigers, 
was the, for them, economically-fortuitous accident of Cold War tensions in the region 
which consequently became the focus of massive US and British military investment. 
Korean society suffered terribly during the civil war but the South’s economy benefited 
from US military  investment,  just  as  Singapore benefited  from UK bases  until  1971 
(which  accounted  for  20  percent  of  the  economy  (Lee,  2000)  and  from  the  US 
requisitioning for the Vietnam war in the late sixties and early seventies which acted to 
replace the lost business from British military withdrawal (Rodan, 1989). 
Social factors were also important. Successful developmental states have depended on 
relative  state  autonomy  from  powerful  social  interests  groups  (Castells,  1992).  This 
relative autonomy was in part inherited and in part constructed. 
Japan’s Meiji regime faced repeated and powerful peasant resistance to reforms (which it  
decisively put down) but it had relatively little opposition from landed and bourgeois 
interests. A commercial bourgeoisie had grown up in Tokugawa Japan but it was neither 
politically, nor economically, powerful and had no class ideology sufficient to challenge 
the hegemony of the new elite after the Meiji Restoration. A substantial fraction of the 
old feudal lords joined the Meiji camp, surrendering their domains, as did many of their 
Samurai  retainers;  both  elites  lost  their  old  feudal  privileges  and  were  perforce 
transformed  into  industrialists,  merchants  and  public  servants,  no  longer  acting  as 
organised class interest groups. Conflicts did emerge in the 1920s and 1930s, fuelling the 
13
struggles  of  neo-nationalist  movements  whose  dénouement  was  the  militaristic 
totalitarian state of the war period (Moore, 1967). However, defeat in the war and US 
occupation saw the decimation of old class factions, including the large Zaibatsu. The 
labour unions were rapidly tamed through sticks and carrots (notably deals on company 
unions and lifetime employment) and the developmental state in Japan thereafter had few 
powerful interest groups to contend with (Perkin, 1996). 
A similar absence or decimation of powerful class interest groups occurred in the tigers. 
American-inspired land reform in the 1950s in Taiwan got rid of the old landed class, as  
it  did  in  Korea  after  1948  (Castells,  1992).  Singapore  had  no  landed  class  to  lose. 
Colonial rule had ensured that none of these countries had a strong native bourgeoisie at 
independence, and labour unions were systematically repressed or incorporated by post-
independence governments in the 1960s (Castells, 1992). 
Developmental states have been able to operate with exceptional autonomy from social 
interests because the social interest groups themselves were weak or were made weak, as 
through the repression of the labour union in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 
70s.  Lack  of  organised  dominant  class  fractions,  along  with  land  reform  and  rapid 
increases in access to education,  also meant relative social equality. In the early phase of 
industrialisation income and wealth differentials were exceptionally low (Birdsall, Ross 
and Sabot, 1995). This gave credence to the notion that all were in the same national boat 
with a shared interest in national development, thus legitimating  dirigiste government 
policies.
Situational nationalism, good timing, American investment, absence of elites and relative 
social equality at the point of take-off – all these have all been important enabling factors 
for the East Asian developmental process. However, what has set the process in motion, 
and kept it  moving, has been the existence of ‘strong’ developmentalist states.  These 
have often been headed by political leaders motivated by large visions and supported by 
competent civil servants who have been generally free of personal corruption (Johnson, 
1982; Gopinathan, 1994; Quah, 1994) (although the same has not always been the case in 
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regard to the political processes). The developmentalist states and their political elites 
have been strongly legitimated, even through their most authoritarian periods, by their 
success in engineering growth and distributing the fruits of prosperity . This has been one 
of their consistent goals. However, their broader mission has often been presented, and 
seen as, above all, one of nation-building. 
The developmental state has assiduously promoted national identity and unity to ensure 
national survival. Some of the cultural ingredients for social cohesion were inherited by 
the developmental states, notably in Confucian traditions of respect for authority and so 
on, but these were not in the first instance particularly consensual or socially-cohesive 
states (Castells, 1992). Some of them, like Singapore, did not even have any history of 
nationhood or national identity. In these new post-colonial tiger states national identity 
and  social  cohesion  had  to  be  engineered,  and  this  was  one  the  primary  early 
preoccupations of the political leaderships (Chua, 1995; Hill and Fee, 1995). Education 
generally played a crucial role in this process.
Globalisation and the Demise of the Developmental State?
During most of the recent phase of accelerated internationalisation,  the developmental 
state  has  had  a  paradoxical  relationship  with  globalization.  Whilst  theories  of 
globalisation generally assume the denationalisation of economies and the weakening of 
nation  states  through  reduced  economic  and  political  autonomy  and  through  the 
development of ‘post-national’ identities, East Asian developmental states have showed 
the  opposite  characteristics.  They  have  remained  ‘strong’  states  with  strong  national 
identities;  they have continued to  be highly interventionist  in their  economies  and in 
social reform; and they have resolutely defended their national economies at the same 
time as aggressively entering the global market. 
In fact, they have achieved exceptionally favourable terms of engagement with the global 
economy by doing all the things that the neo-liberal high priests of globalisation say they 
should  not  do (Amsden,  1992).  Developmental  states  have  generally  supported  rapid 
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growth not by following the market  but by ‘governing the market,’  as the economist 
Robert Wade has argued (Wade, 1990). They have used trade tariffs to protect infant 
industries,  interest  rates  and  government  loans  to  direct  investment;  and  import  and 
export licenses to promote strategic economic sectors. They have not only spent heavily 
on  and  intervened  directly  in  the  building  up  of  infrastructures  for  economic 
development, including in education, transport, IT and Research and Development, but 
they have also used industrial  policy to  steer  companies  into strategic  sectors and to 
create  new markets.  While  Japan and the  Asian tigers  have  used the  global  markets 
relentlessly  to  grow the  economies,  they  have  sought  to  do  so  without  surrendering 
control  over  their  national  economies.  Growth  in  South  Korea,  Taiwan  and  Japan 
depended largely on domestic  capital  and savings. Even in Singapore,  where Foreign 
Direct Investment  was the main engine of growth, the state has managed to maintain 
strategic  control  of  the  kind  of  jobs  investment  brought  in.  Government  successfully 
engineered a major upgrading of sectors and jobs in the 1980s by investing in R and D to 
bring in the high value-added manufacturing and service operations and by encouraging 
exit  of companies with low-value operations through Government  mandated pay rises 
and through taxes on low paid jobs which were used to fund training (Rodan, 1989). 
In the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, however, the situation in East Asia is changing 
rapidly and the relationship between state and international capital is being transformed 
in many countries. It is probably too early to tell how far the East Asian states will remain 
distinctive in their internal structures and their relations to the global economy, but in 
some countries at least, changes are occurring quite fast.
According to Castells (1997) the developmental state has now run its course, at least in 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. It has performed its historic mission and in so doing has 
made itself redundant. It now represents a barrier to development in the informational 
economy of the global age.  According to Castells: ‘The success of the developmental  
states in East Asia ultimately led to the demise of their apparatuses and to the fading of  
their messianic dreams. The societies they helped to engendered through sweat and tears  
are indeed industrialised, modern societies. But at the end of the millennium, their actual  
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projects  are  being  shaped  by  citizens,  now  in  the  open  ground  of  history-making’ 
(Castells, 1997, p.286).
To Castells the developmental state is in retreat for three reasons. The first is that it can 
no longer control the national economy because international capital and multinational 
firms can now bypass it, thus reducing its leverage. The second is that it is inherently 
inflexible and as such incompatible with the demands of the information age. The third is 
that it cannot meet popular demands for increasing democracy and is thus out of step with 
the resurgent civil societies within its borders. 
There  would  seem to be  considerable  evidence  to  support  his  position,  at  least  with 
respect to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.  State control over the economy in each of 
these  countries  has  undoubtedly  diminished  since  1997.  In  fact  it  had  diminished 
substantially  before  through  privatisations  of  key  sectors  and  through  various  de-
regulatory measures, including some - like the over rapid financial liberalisation in South 
Korea  -   which  may  well  have  substantially  added  to  the  economic  crisis  in  1997 
(Castells, 1997; Stiglitz, 1996; Wade and Veneros, 1998). The government in Taiwan has 
long since established a quite  hands-off relationship  with its  corporations.  The South 
Korean  Government  apparently  accepted  the  ‘Washington’  view  after  1997  that  the 
relations between the state and the banks and the major corporations – the Chaebol – had 
been too incestuous and that this had exacerbated the proliferation of bad loans which led 
to the crisis in investor confidence.  It has now substantially withdrawn the state from 
steering of the banks and major companies. In Japan too, after a decade of reforms which 
have failed to bring the economy out of recession, the state has had to acknowledge that it 
can no longer control the economy in the old way. The major corporations and banks 
have become so globalised now that the Ministry of Finance, MITI and the Bank of Japan 
can no longer exercise ‘administrative guidance’ in the way they used too. Failure to 
reform the economy has also meant that the public has substantially lost confidence in the 
competence of the bureaucrats to reform the economy.
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Burgeoning  civil  society  movements  and  demands  for  greater  democracy  have  also 
forced reforms to the state in each of these countries. Taiwan has for some time had a 
flourishing civil  society,  not  least  with  its  significant  feminist  movement.  The KMT 
government was finally ousted in 1988, and the accession of the native Taiwanese, Teng 
Hui Lee, to the presidency began a process of political reform which decisively ushered 
out  the  era  of  the  developmental  state.  The  democracy  movement  in  South  Korea 
likewise brought the end of the authoritarian state with the election of Kim Young Sam 
and the subsequent prosecution for bribery of a number of Chaebol CEOs. The election to 
the presidency in 1997 of the former radical labour leader, Kim Dae Jung, and subsequent 
major labour legislation augured a shift from a model of the developmental state to a new 
form of  state-coordinated  social  partnership  (Choi,  2004).  In  Japan  also,  with  major 
social changes attending the shocks of the bursting of the economic bubble in the early 
1990s and the later Kobe earthquake, there were also significant shifts in the political 
climate, with diminished respect for state authority and mounting demands for greater 
pluralism in politics. The ruling LDP party can no longer take for granted its domination 
of the political process.
 
It would seem certain now that in these East Asian countries the developmental state has 
outlived its historical usefulness. However, it is not at all clear that this is true of all of 
East Asia. 
In Singapore the state  continues  to  be defiantly  and successfully developmentalist.  It 
managed to steer  the country through the 1997 crisis  with less damage than in other 
states,  excepting  Taiwan.  The  country  has  emerged  leaner  and  meaner  from  the 
experience,  and has returned to rapid growth, although not quite at its former levels. Its 
determination to diversify its links with the global economy, and to move increasingly 
into the position of a high value - added service and development hub for the region seem 
likely  to  maintain  its  developmental  dynamism.  This  will  not  reduce  the  growing 
demands,  especially  amongst  the  more  internationalised  middle  class,  for  a  more 
participatory political order or for  greater cultural pluralism. Nor will it necessarily annul 
the  pressures  that  will  arise  from  the  re-emergence  of  unemployment  and  from  the 
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increasingly evident inequalities in wealth and income (Brown, Green and Lauder, 2001). 
However, so long as growth remains, and so long as the state thinks smart both politically 
and economically,  it may forestall the demise of the developmentalist model for some 
time to come, especially if sustained economic development in China gives continuing 
credence to the developmentalist model. China is, of course, currently the fastest growing 
economy in the world and likely to be the fourth largest in the world within a decade or 
less. If it manages to sustain its unusual developmental project  - of Perestroika without 
Glasnost  -  without  social  upheaval  and inter-regional  political  implosion  then  it  will 
provide a powerful model to other developing states. 
Castells  is  quite  clearly  right  to  see  the  demise  of  state  developmentalism in  Japan, 
Taiwan and south Korea. Here at least it is possible to say that the form of strong state , 
borne of the politics of geo-political survival, which paradoxically flourished in the era of 
globalisation, has now been surpassed. These countries will not necessarily now adopt the 
state forms of the dominant neo-liberal western powers. They will remain distinctive, not 
least with their still  powerful notions of national identity and collective consciousness 
which subsist even in the face of growing individualism and diversity. They will develop 
new and distinctive state forms, but it will not be the old developmentalist model.
However, Castells may be wrong to see this demise of the developmental state in these 
countries  as  an  inevitable  concomitant  of  globalisation,  since  several  states  are  still 
successfully  developmentalist  in  the  teeth  of  globalisation.  Developmental  states  in 
Malaysia, China and Singapore are still successfully managing their relations with the 
global  economy.  In the  case  of  Singapore,  arguably the  most  globalised  and ‘wired’ 
country on earth, developmentalism has proved fully compatible -  pace Castells -  with 
the demands of the information age. The surpassing of the particular state form in some 
of  the  East  Asian  countries  may  have  other  -  more  internal  -  causes.  Where 
developmental  states  have  been  surpassed  it  may  have  been  less  a  question  of 
globalisation outgrowing them than them outgrowing themselves.
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Developmental  states  are  a  characteristics  of  early  state  formation  under  specific 
historical  circumstances  (ie  in  particular  geo-political  situations  and where conditions 
favour this type of situational nationalism for ‘late industrialisers’). Historically they have 
invariably been surpassed in time, as states have necessarily been forced to respond to the 
legitimate democratic demands of their people. But it is internal development and internal 
demands for democracy which make the developmental state redundant more, perhaps, 
than the global environment. 
Globalisation, contrary to the myths of the globalists, does not necessarily imply a single 
viable form of economy and state,  although the current neo-liberal  domination of the 
process clearly favours this. In fact, the world today demonstrates that various state forms 
are  compatible  with  globalisation,  at  least  for  certain  periods  in  their  development 
process. Globalisation is a complex and uneven process. Western social scientists who 
postulate universalist models of social change would do well to remember this.
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